Abstract. We present an attack on plain ElGamal and plain RSA encryption. The attack shows that without proper preprocessing of the plaintexts, both ElGamal and RSA encryption are fundamentally insecure. Namely, when one uses these systems to encrypt a (short) secret key of a symmetric cipher it is often possible to recover the secret key from the ciphertext. Our results demonstrate that preprocessing messages prior to encryption is an essential part of both systems.
Introduction
In the literature we often see a description of RSA encryption as C = hM e i mod N (the public key is hN; ei) and a description of ElGamal encryption as C = hMy r ; g r i mod p (the public key is hp; g; yi). Similar descriptions are also given in the original papers 17, 9] . It has been known for many years that this simplied description of RSA does not satisfy basic security notions, such as semantic security (see 6] for a survey of attacks). Similarly, a version of ElGamal commonly used in practice does not satisfy basic security notions (even under the Decision Di e-Hellman assumption 5]) 1 . To obtain secure systems using RSA and ElGamal one must apply a preprocessing function to the plaintext prior to encryption, or a conversion to the encryption function (see 10, 16, 13] for instance). Recent standards for RSA 15] use Optimal Asymmetric Encryption 1 Implementations of ElGamal often use an element g 2 Z p of prime order q where q is much smaller than p. When the set of plaintexts is equal to the subgroup generated by g, the Decision Di e Hellman assumption implies that ElGamal is semantically secure. Unfortunately, implementations of ElGamal often encrypt an m-bit message by viewing it as an m-bit integer and directly encrypting it. The resulting system is not semantically secure { the ciphertext leaks the Legendre symbol of the plaintext.
Padding (OAEP) which is known to be secure against a chosen ciphertext attack in the random oracle model 4]. Currently, there is no equivalent preprocessing standard for ElGamal encryption, although several proposals exist 1, 10, 16, 13] . Unfortunately, many textbook descriptions of RSA and ElGamal do not view these preprocessing functions as an integral part of the encryption scheme. Instead, common descriptions are content with an explanation of the plain systems.
In this paper we give a simple, yet powerful, attack against both plain RSA and plain ElGamal encryption. The attack illustrates that plain RSA and plain ElGamal are fundamentally insecure systems. Hence, any description of these cryptosystems cannot ignore the preprocessing steps used in full RSA and full ElGamal. Our attack clearly demonstrates the importance of preprocessing. It can be used to motivate the need for preprocessing in introductory texts.
Our attack is based on the fact that public key encryption is typically used to encrypt session-keys. These session-keys are typically short, i.e. less than 128 bits. The attack shows that when using plain RSA or plain ElGamal to encrypt an m-bit key, it is often possible to recover the key in time approximately 2 m=2 .
In environments where session-keys are limited to 64-bit keys (e.g. due to government regulations), our attack shows that both plain RSA and plain ElGamal result in a completely insecure system. We experimented with the attack and showed that it works well in practice.
Summary of results
Suppose the plaintext M is m bits long. For illustration purposes, when m = 64 we obtain the following results: { For any RSA public key hN; ei, given C = M e mod N it is possible to recover M in the time it takes to compute 2 2 m=2 modular exponentiations. The attack succeeds with probability 18% (the probability is over the choice of M 2 f0; 1; : : :; 2 m ? 1g). The algorithm requires 2 m=2 m bits of memory. { Let hp; g; yi be an ElGamal public key. When the order of g is at most p=2 m , it is possible to recover M from any ElGamal ciphertext of M in the time it takes to compute 2 2 m=2 modular exponentiations. The attack succeeds with probability 18% (over the choice of M), and requires 2 m=2 m bits of memory.
{ Let hp; g; yi be an ElGamal public key. Suppose p ? 1 = qs where s > 2 m and the discrete log problem for subgroups of Z p of order s is tractable, i.e. takes time T for some small T. When the order of g is p ? 1, it is possible to recover M from any ciphertext of M in time T and 2 2 m=2 modular exponentiations. The attack succeeds with probability 18% (over the choice of M), and requires 2 m=2 m bits of memory.
{ Let hp; g; yi be an ElGamal public key. Suppose again p ? 1 = qs where s > 2 m and the discrete log problem for subgroups of Z p of order s takes time T for some small T. When the order of g is either p?1 or at most p=2 m , it is possible to recover M from any ciphertext of M in time T plus one modular exponentiation and 2 2 m=2 additions, provided a precomputation 3 step depending only on the public key. The success probability is 18% (over the choice of M). The precomputations take time 2 m=2 T and 2 m=2 modular exponentiations. The space requirement can optionally be decreased to 2 m=4 log 2 s bits without increasing the computation time, however with a loss in the probability of success.
All attacks can be parallelized, and o er a variety of trade-o s, with respect to the computation time, the space requirement, and the probability of success. For instance, the success probability of 18% can be raised to 35% if the computation time is quadrupled. Note that the rst result applies to RSA with an arbitrary public exponent (small or large). The attack becomes slightly more e cient when the public exponent e is small. The second result applies to the usual method in which ElGamal is used in practice. The third result applies when ElGamal encryption is done in the entire group, however p?1 has a small smooth factor (a 64-bit smooth factor). The fourth result decreases the on-line work of both the second and the third results, provided an additional precomputation stage. It can optionally improve the time/memory trade-o . The third and fourth results assume that p ? 1 contains a smooth factor: such a property was used in other attacks against discrete-log schemes (see 2, 14] for instance).
Splitting probabilities for integers
Our attacks can be viewed as a meet-in-the-middle method based on the fact that a relatively small integer (e.g., a session-key) can often be expressed as a product of much smaller integers. Note that recent attacks on padding RSA signature schemes 7] use related ideas. Roughly speaking, these attacks expect certain relatively small numbers (such as hashed messages) to be smooth. Here, we will be concerned with the size of divisors. Existing analytic results for the bounds we need are relatively weak. Hence, we mainly give experimental results obtained using the Pari/GP computer package 3].
Let M be a uniformly distributed m-bit integer. We are interested in the probability that M can be written as: lim inf P (m) log(2 );
(2) This is because the probability must include all numbers that are divisible by a prime in the interval 2 m=2 ; 2 m ], and the bound follows from well-known smoothness probabilities.
Our attacks o er a variety of trade-o s, due to the freedom in the factorization form, and in the choices of the m i 's: the splitting probability gives the success probability of the attack, the other parameters determine the cost in terms of storage and computation time. 
Organization of the paper
In Section 2 we introduce the subgroup rounding problems which inspire all our attacks. In Section 3 we present rounding algorithms that break plain ElGamal Table 3 . Experimental probabilities of splitting into four factors.
Bit-length m m1 = m2 = m3 = m4 Probability 64 16 0.5% 20 3%
encryption when g generates a \small" subgroup of Z p . Using similar ideas, we present in Section 4 an attack on plain ElGamal encryption when g generates all Z p , and an attack on plain RSA in Section 5.
The subgroup rounding problems
Recall that the ElGamal public key system 9] encrypts messages in Z p for some prime p. Let g be an element of Z p of order q. The private key is a number in the range 1 x < q. The public key is a tuple hp; g; yi where y = g x mod p.
To encrypt a message M 2 Z p the original scheme works as follows: (1) For the rest of this section we assume g 2 Z p is an element of order q where q p. For concreteness one may think of p as 1024 bits long and q as 512 bits long. Let G q be the subgroup of Z p generated by g. Observe that G q is extremely sparse in Z p . Only one in 2 512 elements belongs to G q . We also assume M is a short message of length much smaller than log 2 (p=q). For example, M is a 64 bits long session-key.
To understand the intuition behind the attack it is bene cial to consider a slight modi cation of the ElGamal scheme. After the random r is chosen one encrypts a message M by computing u = M + y r mod p. That is, we \blind" the message by adding y r rather than multiplying by it. The ciphertext is then hu; vi where v is de ned as before. Clearly y r is a random element of G q . We obtain the following picture:
The marks represent elements in G q . Since M is a relatively small number, encryption of M amounts to picking a random element in G q and then slightly moving away from it. Assuming the elements of G q are uniformly distributed in Z p the average gap between elements of G q is much larger than M. Hence, with high probability, there is a unique element z 2 G q that is su ciently close to u. More precisely, with high probability there will be a unique element z 2 G q 6 satisfying ju ? zj < 2 64 . If we could nd z given u we could recover M. Hence, we obtain the additive version of the subgroup rounding problem:
Additive subgroup rounding: let z be an element of G q and an integer satisfying < 2 m . Given u = z+ mod p nd z. When m is su ciently small, z is uniquely determined (with high probability assuming G q is uniformly distributed in Z p ).
Going back to the original multiplicative ElGamal scheme we obtain the multiplicative subgroup rounding problem.
Multiplicative subgroup rounding: let z be an element of G q and an integer satisfying < 2 m . Given u = z mod p nd z. When m is su ciently small z, is uniquely determined (with high probability assuming G q is uniformly distributed in Z p ).
An e cient solution to either problem would imply that the corresponding plain ElGamal encryption scheme is insecure. We are interested in solutions that run in time O( p ) or, even better, O(log ). In the next section we show a solution to the multiplicative subgroup rounding problem.
The reason we refer to these schemes as \plain ElGamal" is that messages are encrypted as is. Our attacks show the danger of using the system in this way. For proper security one must pre-process the message prior to encryption or modify the encryption mechanism. 3 Algorithms for multiplicative subgroup rounding
We are given an element u 2 Z p of the form u = z mod p where z is a random element of G q and j j < 2 m . Our goal is to nd , which we can assume to be positive. As usual, we assume that m, the length of the message being encrypted, is much smaller than log 2 (p=q). Then with high probability is unique. For example, take p to be 1024 bits long, q to be 512 bits long and m to be 64.
We rst give a simple meet-in-the-middle strategy for multiplicative subgroup rounding. By reduction to a knapsack-like problem, we will then improve both the on-line computation time and the time/memory trade-o of the method, provided that p satis es an additional, yet realistic, assumption.
A meet-in-the-middle method
Suppose can be written as = It is worth noting that 1 and 2 need not be prime. The probability that a random m-bit integer (such as ) can be expressed as a product of two integers, one being less than m 1 bits and the other one being less than m 2 bits, is discussed in Section 1.2.
By choosing di erent values of m 1 and m 2 (not necessarily m=2), one obtains various trade-o s with respect to the computation time, the storage requirement, and the success probability. For instance, when the system is used to encrypt a 64-bit session key, if we pick m 1 = m 2 = 32, the algorithm succeeds with probability approximately 18% (with respect to the session key), and it requires on the order of eight billion exponentiations, far less than the time to compute discrete log in Z p .
We implemented the attack using Victor Shoup's NTL library 19] . The timings should not be considered as optimal, they are meant to give a rough idea of the attack e ciency, compared to exhaustive search attacks on the symmetric algorithm. Running times are given for a single 500 MHz 64-bit DEC Alpha/Linux. If m = 40 and m 1 = m 2 = 20, and we use a 160-bit q and a 512-bit p, the precomputation step takes 40 minutes, and each message is recovered in less than 1 hour and 30 minutes. From Section 1.2, it also means that, given only the public key and the ciphertext, a 40-bit message can be recovered in less than 6 hours on a single workstation, with probability 39%.
Reduction to knapsack-like problems
We now show how to improve the on-line computation time (2 m=2 modular exponentiations) and the time/memory trade-o of the method. We transform the multiplicative rounding problem into a linear problem, provided that p satis es the additional assumption p? It is easy to see that the method outputs all solutions of the 2-table problem, in time 2 min(m1;m2)+1 . The space requirement is O(2 m1 + 2 m2 ).
Since the original problem involves modular sums, it seems at rst glance that we have to apply the previous algorithm twice (with two di erent targets). However, we note that a simple modi cation of the previous algorithm can in fact solve the modular 2-table problem (that is, the 2-table problem with modular 9 additions instead of integer additions). The basic idea is the following. Since T 2 is sorted in descending order, n ? T 2 is sorted in ascending order. The set (n ? T 2 ) mod s though not necessarily sorted, is almost sorted. More precisely, two adjacent numbers are always in the right order, to the exception of a single pair. This is because n ? T 2 is contained in an interval of length s. The single pair of adjacent numbers in reverse order corresponds to the two elements a and b of T 2 surrounding s ? n. These two elements can easily be found by a simple dichotomy search for s ? n in T 2 . And once the elements are known, we can access (n ? T 2 ) (mod s) in ascending order by viewing T 2 as a circular list, starting our enumeration of T 2 by b, and stopping at a.
The total cost of the method is the following. The precomputation of tables T 1 and T 2 requires 2 m1 + 2 m2 modular exponentiations and discrete log computations in a subgroup of Z p of order s, and the sort of T 1 and T 2 . The space requirement is (2 m1 + 2 m2 ) log 2 s bits. For each ciphertext, we require one modular exponentiation, one e cient discrete log (to compute the target), and 2 min(m1;m2)+1 additions. Hence, we improved the on-line work of the method of Section 3.1: loosely speaking, we replaced modular exponentiations by simple additions. We now show how to decrease the space requirement of the method.
The modular 3- Hence, we decreased the space requirement of the method of Section 3.2, by (slightly) increasing the on-line computation work and decreasing the success probability (see Section 1.2 for the probability of splitting into three factors).
More precisely, if m 1 = m 2 = m 3 = m=3, the on-line work is one modular exponentiation, one discrete log in a group of order s, and 2 2n=3 additions. Since an addition is very cheap, this might be useful for practical purposes.
The modular 4-table problem Using 3 factors did not improve the time/memory trade-o of the on-line computation work. Indeed, for both modular 2-table and   modular 3-table problems, our algorithms satisfy TS = O(2 m ) , where T is the number of additions, and S is the space requirement. Surprisingly, one can obtain a better time/memory tradeo with 4 factors. We have log(u qr ) = P 4 i=1 log( qr i ) mod s: Again, in a precomputation step, we compute in a table T i all the logarithms of qr i mod p for 0 i < 2 mi .
We are left with a modular 4- 4 separately. However, the algorithm for the 2-table algorithm described in Section 3.2 accesses the elements of the sorted supertables sequentially, and thus there is no need to store all the possible combinations simultaneously in memory. All we need is the ability to generate them quickly (on-line, upon request) in sorted order. To implement this idea, two priority queues are used :
{ Q 0 stores pairs (t 1 ; t 2 ) from T 1 T 2 , enables arbitrary insertions and deletions to be done in logarithmic time, and makes the pairs with the smallest t 1 +t 2 sum accessible in constant time.
{ Q 00 stores pairs (t 3 ; t 4 ) from T 3 T 4 , enables arbitrary insertions and deletions to be done in logarithmic time, and makes the pairs with the largest t 3 + t 4 sum accessible in constant time.
This leads to the following algorithm for a target n:
{ Sort T 2 into increasing order, and T 4 into decreasing order; { Insert into Q 0 all the pairs (t 1 ; rst(T 2 )) for t 1 4 (not necessarily m=4), give rise to di erent trade-o s with respect to the computation time, the storage requirement, and the success probability.
Our experiments show that, as expected, the method requires much less computing power than a brute-force attack on the 64-bit key using the symmetric encryption algorithm. We implemented the attack on a PII/Linux-400 MHz. Here is a numerical example, using DSS-like parameters:
The 160-bit number q divides the 512-bit number p ? 1. The smooth part of p ? 1 is 4783 1759 1627 139 113 41 11 7 5 2 7 , which is a 69-bit number.
Our attack recovered the 64-bit secret message 14327865741237781950 in only 2 hours and a half (we were lucky, as the maximal running time for 64 bits should be around 14 hours). 4 An attack on ElGamal using a generator of Z p So far, our attacks on ElGamal encryption apply when the public key hp; g; yi uses an element g 2 Z p whose order is much less than p. Although many implementations of ElGamal use such g, it is worth studying whether a \meet-in-themiddle attack" is possible when g generates all of Z p . We show that the answer is positive, although we cannot directly use the algorithm for subgroup rounding. Let hp; g; yi be an ElGamal public key where g generates all of Z p . Suppose an m-bit message M is encrypted using plain ElGamal, i.e. the ciphertext is hu; vi where u = M y r and v = g r . Suppose s is a factor of p ? 1 so that in the subgroup of Z p or order s the discrete log problem is not too di cult (as in Section 3.2), i.e. takes time T for some small T. For example, s may be an integer with only small prime divisors (a smooth integer).
We show that when s > 2 m it is often possible to recover the plaintext from the ciphertext in time 2 m=2 m plus the time it takes to compute one discrete log in the subgroup of Z p of order s. We Note that all the techniques of Section 3.2 can also be applied. The online work of 2 m=2 modular exponentiations is then decreased to 2 m=2 additions, provided the precomputation of many discrete log in G s . Indeed, by taking logarithms in (3), one is left with a modular 2-table problem. Splitting the unknown message M in a di erent number of factors leads to other modular k-table problems. One can thus obtain various trade-o s with respect to the computation time, the memory space, and the probability of success, as described in Section 3.2.
To summarize, when g generates all of Z p the meet-in-the-middle attack can often be used to decrypt ElGamal ciphertexts in time 2 m=2 as long as p ? 1 contains an m-bit smooth factor.
5 A meet-in-the-middle attack on plain RSA To conclude we remark that the same technique used for the subgroup rounding problem can be used to attack plain RSA. This was also mentioned in 8]. In its simplest form, the RSA system 17] encrypts messages in Z N where N = pq for some large primes p and q. The public key is hN; ei and the private key is d, where e d = 1 mod (N) with (N) = (p ? 1)(q ? 1). A message M 2 Z N is then encrypted into c = M e mod N. To speed up the encryption process one often uses a public exponent e much smaller than N, such as e = 2 16 N is present in the table. Any collision will reveal the message M. As in Section 3.1, we note that storing the complete value of M e 1 mod N is not necessary: for instance, storing the 2 max(m 1 ; m 2 ) least signi cant bits should be enough. The attack thus requires 2 m1+1 max(m 1 ; m 2 ) bits of memory and takes 2 m2 modular exponentiations (we can assume that the table sort is negligible, compared to exponentiations).
Using a non-optimized implementation (based on the NTL 19] library), we obtained the following results. The timings give a rough idea of the attack eciency, compared to exhaustive search attacks on the symmetric algorithm. Running times are given for a single 500 MHz 64-bit DEC Alpha/Linux. If m = 40 and m 1 = m 2 = 20, and we use a public exponent 2 16 +1 with a 512-bit modulus, the precomputation step takes 3 minutes, and each message is recovered in less than 10 minutes. From Section 1.2, it also means that, given only the public key and the ciphertext, a 40-bit message can be recovered in less than 40 minutes on a single workstation, with probability at least 39%.
Summary and open problems
We showed that plain RSA and plain ElGamal encryption are fundamentally insecure. In particular, when they are used to encrypt an m-bit session-key, the key can often be recovered in time approximately 2 m=2 . Hence, although an m-bit key is used, the e ective security provided by the system is only m=2
bits. Theses results demonstrate the importance of adding a preprocessing step such as OAEP to RSA and a process such as DHAES to ElGamal. The attack presented in the paper can be used to motivate the need for preprocessing in introductory descriptions of these systems.
There 
